Brodie+S'+Op_Ed+Article

= Merging the Riverines with MSRON Was a Terrible Decision and Here's Why: =




 * On January 12 th , two US Navy Riverine Command Boats (RCBs) and their five man crews were captured by Iran after they entered its territorial waters near Farsi Island in the Persian Gulf. The sailors, assigned to Coastal Riverine Squadron (CRS) Three out of Imperial Beach, CA, have since been released. However, one overwhelming question remains: why did they end up in Iran’s territorial waters? **
 * In an interview with FARS, the official Iranian news service, LT Nartker, the detachment’s ranking officer attributed the error to problems with the navigation system and the engine. The US Navy’s official statement echoed his account. For most people, the analyzation stops here. It was just an equipment malfunction and navigation error, nothing more. **


 * Wrong. **


 * The story is much deeper and complex. Allow me to explain. **


 * Back in 2013, the Navy merged their Riverine Squadrons (RIVRONs) with Maritime Expeditionary Security Squadrons (MSRONs) to create a cost effective unit capable of both defensive and offensive operations. This created huge controversy among the Riverines, who were considered elite warriors with ancestral lineage to the Brown Water Navy in Vietnam. Esprit de Corps was very high within the RIVRONs, and they took their work very seriously. The MSRONs however, were a more relaxed outfit with a defensive mission. Although they were part of the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) and therefore authorized to wear special green camouflage uniforms, they were still regarded by many as part of the Blue Water Navy, as much of their job consisted of escorting US Navy High Value Assets into port and out to sea. **
 * When the two units merged to create Coastal Riverine Squadrons (CORIVRONs), the Riverines were a little more than irked that they were being paired with a less professional unit, and outraged that their highly revered title of “Riverine” was being transferred to these coastal security crewmen. Although the units were merged together, the former RIVRON and MSRON personnel were kept separate. Alpha and Bravo companies were still only trained for Coastal Security, while Delta companies exclusively contained the elite “Riverine” troops, who kept their warrior mindset and mission. **
 * At first, they were kept completely independent. The RIVRON guys did their thing with their stuff, and the MSRON guys did the same. However, the inevitable happened: Riverine Assets were repurposed for Coastal Security. In one squadron, the once green hulled Riverine Command Boats (the iconic symbol of Riverine firepower) were transferred from Delta Company and repainted Blue and Grey. It was these very vessels that were captured by Iran. **
 * While it annoyed the Riverines that their mascot was now under the control of the MSRON types, this change did boost the capability of the Alpha and Bravo companies. Before, their only vessel was the Sea Ark 34’, a small grey hulled vessel that is great for offshore operations, but lacks the long range capability and personnel capacity that the Riverine Command Boat possesses. Some people (like the Pentagon) would stop here and make their conclusion: the merging of MSRON and RIVRON was a success: the Riverines maintained their capability and mission, and the Coastal guys were given new assets to boost their capability. Mission Accomplished. **


 * Nope. Not quite. **


 * As I mentioned earlier, one of the reasons the merge happened was due to budget cuts. The Navy no longer had a high demand for a Riverine capable fighting force, but still wanted to keep it around. The merge downsized and divided the Riverine element of the NECC, and took funding away. While the merge opened the door for the sharing of assets between MSRON and RIVRON, it also took a lot of funding away from the actual Riverines. The main mission of the Coastal Riverine Squadron remained that of MSRON: port security and defense of Navy high value assets. Therefore, the majority of the Coastal Riverine Force budget has gone to funding MSRON type operations and training. With limited funds to purchase boat fuel and ammunition for training exercises and operations, the higher ups are always bound to choose Alpha and Bravo companies as the recipients, making underway training exercises (and deployments) for Delta companies a very rare occasion. **
 * Even Alpha and Bravo companies weren't receiving as much funding as they needed. Boats weren't getting the advanced maintenance they needed often enough, and when they did, it was from civilian contractors from the company that makes them. When the Riverine Command Boats were added to the Alpha/Bravo inventory, the crews were given basic instruction on the maintenance of the vessel, but once deployed, they didn’t have access to the advice of the Delta company mechanics, who were the owners and operators of the RCB since 2007. Theoretically, when the Coastal Riverine Force structure was created, Delta companies were intended to deploy with Alpha/Bravo companies to their area of operations, to provide offensive capabilities, and it was assumed that Delta RCB mechanics would also work on Alpha/Bravo RCBs. However, the area of operations that they deploy to have a severe lack of rivers and opportunities to conduct maritime interdiction and direct action missions; so instead Delta Companies go on their own deployments (usually to South America where there are rivers, jungles, and no shortage of drug smugglers and other criminal activity), where they train and assist local riverine forces in their operations, and participate in joint training exercises. **
 * This leaves Alpha and Bravo companies in the Persian Gulf, equipped with Riverine Command Boats (which require a lot of maintenance to operate), and without the proper maintenance resources. Naturally, these conditions were eventually going to result in some sort of mechanical failure. Unfortunately, that breakdown happened when the sailors were trying to get out of Iranian waters, which they had entered due to navigational errors. The RCB was still a new addition to Alpha/Bravo companies, and long range transiting was not an everyday occurrence. They entered the water due to negligence (they didn’t check and adjust their course often enough to realize their navigation system wasn’t calibrated), and when they realized their mistake and tried to flee, their boats broke. **
 * While the crew of the boat made mistakes, I don’t blame the sailors themselves, but the higher ups that put them in that situation. They were in a potentially dangerous area, with equipment they weren't adequately trained to use, and going on long range transits (something they don’t have a lot of practice with). Merging RIVRON with MSRON was a mistake. Not only did it lower morale among the Riverines, but it also created a situation in which the Coastal Security forces received assets that they weren't adequately trained to use, and used these assets to go on missions they weren't adequately trained for. **
 * If the Navy wanted to cut funds to the Riverines, they could have just merged all the RIVRONs into one lone RIVRON. This would have prevented the social friction between MSRON and RIVRON generated by the merge, and would have let the Riverines focus on their own mission instead of trying to do stuff like train Alpha and Bravo company to use the RCB and hustle to get funding to just get underway; and it would have preserved the legacy, reputation, and effectiveness of the Riverine Squadrons. **
 * <span style="background-color: transparent; color: #000000; font-family: Arial; font-size: 14.66px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">This is where some people would try to argue that this arrangement would have left the MSRONs without a long range capable boat. However, even before the Iran incident, the Navy had ordered the brand new MK VI patrol boat and SBI Coastal Command Boat to assume the job of the RCB. Coastal Riverine Squadron Two (which has since relieved CRS-3 in the gulf) has already received two of these craft. While this arrangement would have indeed left the MSRONs without a long range capable boat from about 2014-2016, MSRON was previously able to operate without boats like that since their inception in 1997; and if they were in dire need for such a boat, they would have eventually received RCBs not being used by the lone RIVRON, and been given better training and resources because they wouldn’t have had pre-existing RCB mechanics and crewmen within their squadron. **


 * <span style="background-color: transparent; color: #000000; font-family: Arial; font-size: 14.66px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">Problem solved. **


 * <span style="background-color: transparent; color: #000000; font-family: Arial; font-size: 14.66px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">PS to Alpha and Bravo companies: **
 * <span style="background-color: transparent; color: #000000; font-family: Arial; font-size: 14.66px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">Guys, if you’re going to use Riverine craft, you better have a Riverine attitude. If Delta Company personnel had been the crew of those crafts in January, they probably would have started an international incident (let’s just ignore the fact that they wouldn’t have been in Iranian waters at all), but they sure as hell wouldn’t been captured. And even had they been captured, they damn sure wouldn’t have broken the US Code of Conduct and apologized on international television. Either figure out how to maintain and operate your boats, or repaint them green and return them to Riverines, where they belong. **